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Abstract 
Can an order for a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (the 
Court), made by a lower instance national court, be subject to an appeal to a higher instance national 
court? To date, the Court has not been sufficiently clear on an answer to this exact question. The 
Cartesio judgment mandated that national law could not permit a higher instance national 
court from varying an order for reference, setting aside an order for reference, or ordering the 
resumption of national proceedings whilst awaiting the return of the preliminary reference. However, 
the Court did not say that appeals against an order for reference, more generally, were incompatible, 
per se, with Union law. This article contends that such breadth given to higher instance national courts 
is contrary to the intent of Article 267 TFEU, which aims to ensure effective judicial dialogue between 
all national courts and the Court, uninterrupted by national law and practice. This article makes the 
case for ending this regime of undue deference to national procedural autonomy on this question, 
which is problematic in circumstances where the rule of law and judicial independence in all Member 
States cannot be assumed.  
 Associate Professor of Law, Aarhus University, Denmark. gb@law.au.dk  
 Lecturer in Law, School of Law, Keele University, United Kingdom. j.cotter@keele.ac.uk 




National courts; Court of Justice of the European Union; Preliminary reference procedure; national 
procedural autonomy; Appeals; Appellate courts. 
1. Introduction 
The effective functioning of the preliminary reference procedure, the paramount means of 
dialogue between national courts of EU Member States and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (the Court), has important consequences for the functioning of entirety of the EU legal order. 
Given that an appeal against a lower court order to refer within the national legal system has, at the 
very least, the potential to interrupt the direct line of communication between the referring court and 
the Court, a question arises as to whether such appeals are permissible. Neither EU primary and 
secondary law make an explicit provision for an appeal against an order for a preliminary reference 
by a national court or tribunal.  
There is case law on this matter. However, the Court has, as argued in this article, not taken 
sufficient account of the potential harmful effects of appeals of orders for a preliminary reference 
within national legal systems. National law cannot amend Article 267 TFEU; it stands alone, and has 
direct application in Member States. It imposes, without question, the possibility for all national 
courts to make a preliminary reference at their own motion, without any hindrance from higher 
instance national courts. Whilst it is accepted that Article 267 TFEU does not explicitly exclude 
appeals within a national legal system against orders for a preliminary reference,1 such a reductive 
and literalist approach would be inappropriate when considering the meaning of the provision so 
central to the functioning of the EU legal order.  
As long noted 2 
This includes all national courts. While Article 267 TFEU has the ideal of uniformity underpinning 
it, its usage varies across Member States because of differences in national procedural rules. The 
CILFIT 
3 Accordingly, an appeal against 
reference has two distinct consequences. Firstly, it has the potential to affect the uniformity of Union 
1 Case C-146/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 
Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf II paragraph 3; Case C-334/95, Krüger GmbH & Co. KG v 
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, ECLI:EU:C:1997:378, paragraphs 50-54; Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató 
bt, ECLI:EU:C:2008:723, paragraph 93.  
2 Gerhard Bebr, Development of Judicial Control of the European Communities (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1981). p. 
398.  
3 Case C-283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335, paragraph 15.  
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law by, for instance, disincentivising lower court references; and, secondly, it filters the pursuit of 
effective legal remedies under Union law.4  
This article argues that the Court should not allow, under any circumstances, higher instance 
national courts to entertain appeals of orders for a preliminary reference of lower instance national 
courts. It considers what the impact may be of a recent judgment of a higher instance court of a 
Member State, and what that reveals as regards 
issue of appeals of lower instance national courts  orders for a preliminary reference. This is done in 
s lead judgment on this question in Cartesio,5 which, whilst a step in the right 
direction, did not go far enough in protecting lower instance national courts.  
Post-Cartesio, how national courts (and tribunals) are to respond to appeals of orders for 
preliminary references is unclear.6 It has been openly pondered why the Court has never given a 
definitive answer on this issue, and why the Court wavered in its earlier case law. 
irresolute approach may have been an attempt to balance the interests of judicial dialogue on the one 
hand, and national procedural autonomy on the other.7 In this article, it is argued that the Court will 
have to take a stronger stance to protect lower instance national courts against interference from 
higher instance national courts in the preliminary reference procedure than it previously did in 
judgments such as Cartesio and Pohotovost.8 For the reasons set out herein, the article invites the 
Court to extend its jurisprudence to make a more assertive attempt at stopping higher instance national 
courts from entertaining appeals against orders for a preliminary reference from lower instance 
national courts.  
2. As Union law stands  Cartesio 
It is the most peculiar, often trivial, of circumstances that can give rise important matters of 
constitutional significance for the functioning of the EU legal order. This saga, relating to the question 
of appeals of orders for preliminary references, features a cereal exporter having an issue with a 
national intervention agency for cereal;9 
State to another;10 and a data protection commissioner in an EU Member State taking proceedings 
4 
Review 87. p. 100.  
5 Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, ECLI:EU:C:2008:723. 
6 A point even made by those stating the status quo, post-Cartesio, was sufficient. 
against an Order to Refer under  p. 313.  
7 rinciples of Equivalence and 
 p. 33.  
8 Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, ECLI:EU:C:2008:723, and, Case C-470/12, 
, ECLI:EU:C:2014:101. 
9 Case C-146/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 
Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf II -166/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf I Note, the two cases were 
referred by two different national courts in Germany.  
10 Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltaató bt, ECLI:EU:C:2008:723.   
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against a technology company from the United States.11 The case law from the Court concerning 
appeals of an order for a preliminary reference was initially inconsistent, but over time, has become 
more stringent, but not sufficiently stringent to protect lower instance national courts.  
Since as far back as 1961, the Court has been dealing with the actions of higher instance 
national courts on this issue. In De Geus v Bosch,12 the very first preliminary reference before the 
Court, the order for a preliminary reference was appealed within the national system. Advocate 
General Lagrange made clear that he did not agree with the assertion that an appeal of a lower instance 
order for a preliminary reference would automatically suspend proceedings before 
the Court.13 The Court agreed, stating that 
solely on the existence of a request for a preliminary ruling within the meaning of Article [267 
14 Thus, from the outset, the Court acted in a manner that was not receptive to higher instance 
national courts interfering with lower instance national courts orders for preliminary references. The 
Court was of the view that its ability to deliver a judgment was based on the existence of questions 
asked of it by a national court, regardless of the position of the referring court in the national judicial 
hierarchy.  
Despite the seeming assertion by the Court of the importance of lower instance national courts, 
the Court in De Geus v Bosch did not rule out the possibility of a higher instance national court 
overturning an order for a preliminary reference. Indeed, there may be a contradiction between the 
time, asserting that appeals against an order to refer are a matter for national courts,15 thus subjecting 
preliminary references to potential interference. The context of the case, occurring as it did in the 
earlier years of European legal integration, might give some indication as to why the Court might not 
have wished to antagonise higher instance national courts, who the Court would have viewed as an 
important ally.  
A few years later in Chanel v Cepeha, on the suspensory effect of an appeal against an order 
for a preliminary reference, Advocate General Roemer took a different approach. He suggested the 
submitted to it; [and that] it may only do so when the [national court] has given judgment on the 
appeal brought against the decision to make 16 and that given the appeal made, the 
11 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Schrems [2017] IEHC 545, Costello J; which is Case 
C-311/18, Facebook Ireland and Schrems Schrems II  
12 Case C-13/61, Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch GmbH and Maatschappij tot 
voortzetting van de zaken der Firma Willem van Rijn De Geus v. Bosch  
13 Opinion of Advocate General Lagrange, Case C-13/61, Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert 
Bosch GmbH and Maatschappij tot voortzetting van de zaken der Firma Willem van Rijn, De Geus 
v. Bosch  
14 Case C-13/61, Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch GmbH and Maatschappij tot 
voortzetting van de zaken der Firma Willem van Rijn De Geus v. Bosch  
15 4). p. 92.  
16 Opinion of Advocate General Roemer, Case C-31/68, SA Chanel v. Cepeha Handelsmaatschappij NV, 
ECLI:EU:C:1969:18, page 412.  
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17 The Court, accepting the Opinion of the Advocate 
General, and turning on its back on its De Geus v Bosch judgment, suspended the case
notification t 18 and the case was later removed from the 
register after the appeal at the national court was successful. The proposal of the Advocate General 
here, and the action by the Court, are highly regrettable, and case law that the Court soon came to 
regret. Comparing the actions of the Court in De Geus v Bosch with those in Chanel v Cepeha, we 
made in 
Chanel v Cepeha, the Court did not explain its change in approach in any way.  
arrived not long after. In BRT v SABAM,19 the 
defendant notified the Court that it had appealed the order for a preliminary reference of the national 
court to a higher instance in that Member State, and pleaded that the Court should suspend the 
proceedings, pending the outcome of the appeal. Advocate General Mayras noted that the Court had 
been informed by the lower instance national court that, notwithstanding that its order for a 
preliminary reference had been appealed
20 Noting that the referring national court wanted answers, 
Advocate General Mayras proposed that the treaties, and more specifically Article 267 TFEU, 
established 
interpretation of [Union] law which they consider necessary for the solution of disputes brought 
before them 21 22 as otherwise, in the 
23 
Moreover, the Court added that a  of the national court has 
24 This, therefore, marked a return to the 
essence of De Geus v Bosch, and disavowed Chanel v Cepeha.  
Subsequently, however, in the Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf cases, the Court began to dither. It is 
necessary to distinguish the two Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf cases  Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf I25 and 
17 Ibid., page 409.  
18 Order of the Court, Case C-31/68, SA Chanel v. Cepeha Handelsmaatschappij NV, ECLI:EU:C:1970:52, page 404.  
19 Case C-127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie and société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs v. SV SABAM and 
NV Fonior, ECLI:EU:C:1974:6 ( BRT v. SABAM  
20 Opinion of Advocate General Mayras, Belgische Radio en Televisie and société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et 
éditeurs v. SV SABAM and NV Fonior BRT v. SABAM ge 67.  
21Ibid., page 69.  
22 Case C-127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie and société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs v. SV SABAM and 
NV Fonior BRT v. SABAM  
23 Ibid., paragraph 17.  
24 Case C-127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie and société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs v. SV SABAM and 
NV Fonior BRT v. SABAM  
25 Case C-166/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 
Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf I  
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Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf II.26 The former, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf I, stressed the importance of the 
uniformity of Union law to which the preliminary reference procedure contributes. It thus confirmed 
the rights of lower instance national courts making orders for preliminary references, stating that 
existence of a rule of domestic law whereby a court is bound on points of law by the rulings of the 
court superior to it cannot of itself take away the power provided for by Article [267 TFEU] of 
27  
In Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf II, whilst the Court did not say that orders for preliminary 
references from lower instance national courts could not be the subject of an appeal, it did point out 
that regardless of an order being appealed, the Court would 
ve its full effect so long as it has 
28 Thus, it would proceed with a case as normal. However, regretfully, it went on 
to say 
this Court for a preliminary ruling from remaining subject to the remedies normally available under 
29  
Academic writing differed on where the law s
.30 Another view was 
that appeals of orders made by lower instance national courts were allowed, and compatible with 
Union law.31 Such appeals would, of course, have to be distinguished from any national law seeking 
to limit a national court s discretion to make an order for a preliminary reference in the first place, 
since such laws would clearly be contrary to Article 267 TFEU.  
In 2008, the Cartesio judgment clarified the prior case law, and in some ways, extended it. 
Th Cartesio has been described as moving from that seen in Rheinmühlen-
Düsseldorf II, leaving national procedural laws alone, towards a system of harmonisation.32 In 
Cartesio,33 the Court clarified that Article 267 TFEU is to be interpreted in a manner that the 
jurisdiction of any national court to make an order for a preliminary reference cannot be called into 
26 Case C-146/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 
Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf II Confusingly, the case lodged first was adjudicated upon later than 
the case lodged second.  
27 Case C-166/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 
Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf I paragraph 5.  
28 Case C-146/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 
Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf II  
29 Ibid., paragraph 3. 
30 Francis G Jacobs and Andrew Durand, References to the European Court: Practice and Procedure (Butterworths 1975). 
p. 171.  
31 anta, P.M.P.A. Oil Company Ltd., 
Tedcastle McCormick and Company Ltd. v. The Minister for Industry and Energy, Ireland, The Attorney General and 
The Irish National Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (1982 on 
Market Law Review 741. p. 749.  
32 Bobek (n 6). p. 314.  
33 Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, ECLI:EU:C:2008:723.  
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question by the application of; 1) national procedural rules that permit an appellate court to vary the 
order for reference; 2) to set aside the reference; 3) and to order the referring court to resume the 
national law proceedings.34  
The Court did not go as far as the Advocate General however, who had a bolder, more daring 
proposition [t]he [t]reat[ies] did not intend that such a dialogue 
[between national courts and the Court] should be filtered by any other national courts, no matter 
what the judicial .35 He was more clearly in favour of an approach that 
appeals of orders for a preliminary reference by lower instance national courts could not be subject 
to appeal. Drawing support for this assertion, he relied approvingly upon the Supreme Court of 
Campus Oil (analysed below).  
While the Cartesio judgment does not compel the referring national court to withdraw or 
amend an original order for a preliminary reference subsequent to an appeal to a higher instance 
national court, the potential for an appellate procedure to delay, frustrate, and assert pressure on a 
lower instance national court is evident. The permissive approach by the Court in Rheinmühlen-
Düsseldorf II, and in Cartesio, may, in demonstrating considerable deference to national procedural 
autonomy, have underestimated the potential stymying effect of such appeals, deterring the 
willingness of lower instance national courts to refer, and the enthusiasm of litigants to push for 
preliminary references.  
Another point that should be borne in mind is that the Cartesio judgment also did not preclude 
higher instance national courts rules taking control of the main proceedings for itself on appeal, 
thereby obviating the need for any order for a preliminary reference made by a lower instance national 
court. This was made clear in the subsequent case of De Nationale Loterij,36 in which the Court ruled 
that there was no need for it to reply to a preliminary reference sent to it by a lower court national 
court because a higher instance national court, taking the view that a preliminary reference was 
unnecessary, had ruled on the substance of the main proceedings, meaning there were no longer any 
proceedings pending. In so ruling, the Court referred to both Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf II and Cartesio 
as authority for the proposition that Union law does not prohibit lower instance national court orders 
for references being subject to remedies normally available under national law.37  
This judgment of the Court in De Nationale Loterij was particularly troubling. Unlike in the 
 Cartesio judgment (or Schrems II of the Supreme Court of Ireland, analysed below), where 
the referring lower instance national court retains possession of the main proceedings, and can 
ultimately decide whether or not to abide by the higher instance national court  judgment, the 
Belgian procedure in De Nationale Loterij dispossessed the referring lower instance national court of 
this discretion by taking the case from it. The potential for the creation of such appellate procedures, 
34 Ibid., paragraph 98.  
35 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt., ECLI:EU:C:2008:294, 
paragraph 19.  
36 Case C-525/06, De Nationale Loterij NV v Customer Service Agency BVB, ECLI:EU:C:2009:179.  
37 Ibid., paragraph 6.  
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effectively depriving lower instance national courts of their full discretion to make an order for a 
preliminary reference under Article 267 TFEU, should be obvious. 
3. The definitively correct outcome  Campus Oil  
Campus Oil, given its importance for the interpretation of the public security justificatory 
ground in Article 36 TFEU, requires no introduction to EU lawyers.38 However, in the Member State 
in which the case originated, Campus Oil means many things, and the litigation gave rise to a number 
of judgments of significant importance on a variety of legal subject areas. Among this series of 
judgments is one that has had enduring consequences for the reception and functioning of Union law 
in the legal order of a Member State.  
In an appeal of the order for a preliminary reference made by the High Court of Ireland, the 
appellate court, the Supreme Court of Ireland, ruled that such an order for a preliminary reference 
could not be the subject of an appeal to a higher instance national court.39 The judgment is routinely 
cited, in Union law literature more generally, as support for such an assertion.40 However, in 2019, 
the Supreme Court handed down judgment in Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland 
Limited and Schrems41 (hereinafter, Schrems II, analysed in the next section), which, despite the 
Cour appears to have significantly qualified the Supreme s earlier 
judgment in Campus Oil, on what are argued herein, dubious grounds, and questionable from the 
perspective of Union law.  
In Campus Oil, the High Court made an order for a preliminary reference on two questions to 
the Court, enquiring as to the compatibility of national measures with provisions of EU primary law. 
The order was made before evidence and argument on the factual effects of the secondary legislation 
had been heard.42 The High Court set out a limited set of facts agreed by the parties,43 in circumstances 
38 Case C-72/83, Campus Oil Limited and others v Minister for Industry and Energy and others, ECLI:EU:C:1984:256. 
39 Campus Oil Ltd v Minister for Industry and Energy 
concurring). See, 
of European Law 103.  
40 For instance, Morten Broberg and Niels Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (Oxford 
University Press 2010). p. 328. Monica Claes,  (Hart 
Publishing 2006). p. 525. Furthermore, at the Court, see, Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Case C-210/06, Cartesio 
Oktató és Szolgáltató bt., ECLI:EU:C:2008:294, paragraph 19, placing an emphasis of Campus Oil judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Ireland.   
41 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Schrems [2019] IESC 46 (Clark
Dunne, Charleton, and Finlay Geoghegan JJ concurring).  
42 Campus Oil Ltd v Minister for Industry and Energy [1984] 1 CMLR 479 (Murphy J), at 484. See, Kamiel Mortelmans, 
nd Energy, and Others, Judgment of 10 July 
  
43 As evidenced in the Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Case C-72/83, Campus Oil Limited and others v Minister for 
Industry and Energy and others, ECLI:EU:C:1984:154, p. 2758.  
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where the wider range of factual circumstances were disputed.44 However, the defendants argued 
before the High Court that a reference was not necessary or, alternatively, was premature, and the 
defendants appealed the eventual order for a preliminary reference to the Supreme Court.45 At the 
time, Article 34.4.  of the Constitution of Ireland (Bunreacht na hÉireann) provided, subject to 
Supreme Court.46  
appeal, holding that that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the 
exercise by a lower court of its discretion to make an order for a preliminary reference. One of the 
xisting 
case law on the point from the Court, in particular Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf II,47 in which the Court 
had ruled that appeals against national court determinations to refer were not contrary to Union law, 
if permitted by national procedural rules. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged this 
jurisprudence in the penultimate paragraph of its judgment, stating tha of interest in showing 
the views of the Court itself in examining the question as a question of [Union] 48 it did not rely 
upon the case law of the Court, since the matter was one of national law.  
This statement was based on the premise that upon the Member State Union, 
the EU treaties itself became part of domestic law. Reasoning as a matter of national law as to why a 
lower instance national court  order for a preliminary reference could not be the subject of an appeal, 
the Supreme Court pointed to the fact that the power conferred upon a national judge by Article 267 
without any qualification, express or implied, to the effect that it is capable of being 
44 In the contemporary context, Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court requires a referring court to provide, in 
levant findings of fact as 
 
45 Campus Oil 
of Trends and Patterns in the 
(2004) 11 Irish Journal of European Law 408. p. 443.  
46 This state of affairs changed as a result of the thirty-third amendment to the Constitution in 2013. It is now the Court 
of Appeal, established by the same amendment, which, subject to exceptions provided by law, has appellate jurisdiction 
from all High Court decisions (Article 34.4. ). The Supreme Court is now the Court of Final Appeal, which can hear 
appeals from the Court of Appeal if the Supreme Court is satisfied the decision involves a matter of general public 
importance, or in the interests of justice it is necessary that there be an appeal (Article 34.5. ). The Supreme Court may 
also, subject to regula
exceptional circumstances warranting a direct appeal to it, and a precondition for the supreme court being so satisfied is 
the presence of either or both of the following factors: i the decision involves a matter of general public importance; ii the 
(Article 34.5. ) See, Graham Butler, The Road to a Court of Appeal Part I: History and 
Irish Law Times 208 Part II: 
Irish Law Times 222.  
47 Case C-166/73, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 
Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf I  
48 Campus Oil Ltd v Minister for Industry and Energy 
concurring), at 487-488. 
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overruled by any 49 [t]he national judge has an 
untrammelled discretion as to whether he will or will not refer questions for a preliminary ruling 
under Article [267 TFEU] and in doing so he is not in any way subject to the parties or to any other 
50 Elaborating on this conclusion, the Supreme Court observed that the purpose of 
Article 267 to enable the national judge to have direct and unimpeded access to the only 
Court which has jurisdiction to furnish him w 51 Fettering that right 
by making it subject to review on appeal would, a be contrary to both 
the spirit and th 52 
The Supreme Court also considered the argument advanced by the appellants that an appeal 
order for a preliminary reference by virtue of Article 34.4.  of Bunreacht 
na hÉireann, which as mentioned previously, provided, subject to exceptions provided for by law, 
took the view, however, that the order made by the High Court 
the meaning of Article 34 of Bunreacht na hÉireann, since the High Court judge had not made any 
order having any legal effect on the parties, as he had not applied EU primary law to the case. Once 
that had been done, the Supreme 
be amenable to appeal.53  
What must be emphasized at this juncture, however, and this point will be relevant in the 
Schrems II below
Bunreacht na hÉireann were obiter. In other words, the 
Supreme id not form part of the ratio decidendi of the judgment, 
that portion which, under the common law doctrine of stare decisis, is of binding precedential value 
in subsequent cases. The ratio of the judgment, rather, rested on the literal and purposive 
interpretation of Article 267 TFEU. This much is made by clear by the Supreme Court, which clearly 
stated that even if the order for a preliminary reference within the meaning of Article 
34 of , the Court would rule that pursuant to Article 29.4.  of Bunreacht na 
, the yield to the primacy of Article [267 TFEU 54 
Several matters are worthy of further analysis. 
was purely a question of national Rheinmühlen-
Düsseldorf II, which had made the question essentially one of national procedural law. It is, however, 
noteworthy that the Supreme Court did not acknowledge the jurisprudence of the Court as the source 
of its latitude to regard the question as one of national law. Instead, the Supreme Court adopted its 
own understanding of the meaning of the EU treaties in the specific context of national law. In doing 
49 Ibid., 486. 
50 Ibid., 486-487.  
51 Ibid., 487. 
52 Ibid., 487. 
53 Ibid., 487. 
54 Campus Oil Ltd v Minister for Industry and Energy 
concurring), at 487. 
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so, the Supreme Court adopted an interpretation, relying upon its own literal and purposive 
assessment, and one that is, as has been pointed out elsewhere, further reaching and more 
communautaire than that adopted by the Court itself.55 While the Court has had a permissive 
approach, and one which was respectful of national procedural autonomy, the Supreme Court 
interpreted Article 267 TFEU as provid  as to 
whether to refer.56  
Moreover, w  TFEU was provided in a 
national context only, it is difficult to imagine why that interpretation would change in any other 
jurisdiction that, like the Member State in this case, had no pre-existing specific procedural rules on 
the question, given the absolute manner in which the interpretation is expressed. It is arguable, 
therefore, that while the Supreme Court accepted the doctrine of primacy of Union law per se, it is, 
at least indirectly, questioned the position of the Court as ultimate interpreter of the EU treaties in a 
national context. However, it is not evident that the Supreme Court was doing so consciously, or 
would accept this perception of its judgment, as it also acknowledged that the Court is the sole judicial 
actor with the jurisdiction to furnish rulings to national courts on interpretations of Union law.57  
Notwithstanding these arguable logical inconsistencies in the judgment, Campus Oil 
represented a robust defence of the functioning of the preliminary reference procedure and a strong 
assertion of the unqualified right of lower instance national courts to make a reference to the Court  
a direct line of communication that is not to be interrupted by a higher instance national court. It was 
this precedent with which the appellant in Schrems II contended, and it is to that case that this article 
now turns. 
4. The definitively incorrect outcome  Schrems II 
The procedural background of Schrems II is, as the Supreme Court itself pointed out, rather 
unusual. As the Supreme Court alluded to at the commencement of its judgment,58 the proceedings 
constitute the latest episode in the continuing controversy concerning the transfer of data from the 
EU to third countries, with a privacy advocate and an American multinational company again finding 
themselves pitched against one another in a complex legal dispute. In the proceedings brought before 
the High Court, the Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) sought a single, declaratory relief: an 
Article 267 TFEU reference to the Court to question the validity of the aforementioned legal 
instruments.  
55 
(1997) 6 Irish Journal of European Law 24. p. 37.  
56 Campus Oil Ltd v Minister for Industry and Energy [1984] 1 CMLR 479 (Wal
concurring), at 487. 
57 Ibid., 487. 
58 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Schrems 
Dunne, Charleton, and Finlay Geoghegan JJ concurring), paras 1.1-1.7. 
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The nature of the proceedings, taken in isolation, might cause one to question whether a 
preliminary reference in these proceedings would be admissible before a national court. The text of 
Article 267 TFEU requires that a preliminary reference be necessary to enable the referring court to 
give judgment. In the proceedings before the High Court, the court was not confronted with a dispute 
in which it would be required to give judgment once the preliminary ruling was rendered. Two 
contestable assumptions, which are not the focus of this article, underpinned the proceedings. Firstly, 
the applicant, a public body, the DPC is not able to make an order for a preliminary reference itself; 
and secondly, that the ruling of the Court prior to the Schrems cases, to the extent that it requires 
Member States to ensure that data protection bodies (are enabled refer any doubts as to the validity 
of EU measures to the Court), overrides any concern about the admissibility of cases commenced 
solely for the purpose of obtaining a preliminary reference.  
Despite opposition from the American multinational, the High Court made an order for a 
preliminary reference on eleven questions.59 Facebook sought leave to appeal the order for a 
preliminary reference to the Supreme Court, despite concerns as to whether a lower instance national 
court decision to make an order for a preliminary reference could be appealed. The Supreme Court 
granted leave to appeal.60 The appeal focussed on two sets of issues: first, whether a decision of a 
lower instance national court to make an order for a preliminary reference could, as a matter of 
national constitutional law, and Union law, be the subject matter of an appeal, and, if so, what the 
scope of such an appeal might be. Secondly, proceeding on the assumption that some form of appeal 
that the High 
Court had erred in its determination of the relevant U.S. law. 
The Supreme Court commenced by noting that C  jurisprudence in Cartesio and 
Pohotovost pre interfer[ing] with the sole competence of the referring 
court to decide whether to maintain, withdraw or 61 However, the 
Supreme Court moved in the next breath to conclude that in a case such as that at bar, the Supreme 
Court could in accordance with ordinary principles of overturn findings of fact by the 
62  
Turning to Campus Oil, the Supreme Court distinguished that case from the present one, 
pointing to the fact that the High Court in Campus Oil had not made any finding as to the facts or 
national law; and that this could be distinguished from the present Schrems II case, where the High 
59 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Schrems [2017] IEHC 545 (Costello J). 
60 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Schrems 
Dunne, Charleton, and Finlay Geoghegan JJ concurring). See, 
in DPA v Facebook And Schrems: Putting National And European Judicial Independen
Supreme Court Review 125. 
61 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Schrems 
Dunne, Charleton, and Finlay Geoghegan JJ concurring), para. 6.2. 
62 Ibid., para. 6.2. 
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Court had made a number of factual findings. Accordingly, the judgment of the High Court in 
Schrems II 63  
The Supreme Court then created a further important distinction: between the order for a 
preliminary reference (defined narrowly by the Supreme Court as the questions being referred) on 
one hand; and any findings of fact and national law necessary to underpin the order for a preliminary 
reference on the other, with only the latter, having regard to Campus Oil of its own court, and Cartesio 
of the Court, being capable of being the subject of an appeal.64  
Drawing upon the Court
stated that for a referring court to determine if a preliminary reference is necessary, it will have to at 
least consider matters of fact and/or national law, and in some cases, might even be necessary to 
deliver a preliminary judgment making a final determination on those matters. However, the Supreme 
Court was also keen to emphasiz
law findings in a reference should not be exercised in the vast majority of cases. In particular, the 
the interests of justice and the proper use of  as 
militating against such appeals in circumstances where, in the vast majority of cases, an aggrieved 
party could appeal the final determination of the lower court after the ruling had returned from the 
Court. The Supreme Court recognized that the result of such an appeal might mean that the fully 
resolved reference might turn out to have been unnecessary.65  
The Supreme  at play which would justify 
allowing an sui generis 
nature of the proceedings, which had arisen because of the obligation imposed on Member States by 
the Court in a prior Schrems case, which required the referring national court to determine the facts 
an appeal would be possible after the conclusion of the main proceedings before the referring court, 
that was not possible in the immediate case, where the sole relief sought was an order for a preliminary 
reference. For the Supreme Court to refuse the appeal in such circumstances would, according to its 
judgment, amount to abdication of its constitution role to review lower instance national court  
findings of fact.66  
Having determined that there was no impediment in national law to the Supreme Court 
reviewing the factual findings of a lower court underpinning a reference, the Court then proceeded to 
consider whether Union law placed any limitations on this jurisdiction. Although maintaining that the 
Cartesio jurisprudence terms of the question 
themselves, the Supreme Court added that there was equally nothing in the Court
prohibited an appeal against a finding of fact or national law underpinning an order for a preliminary 
reference, if permitted in law national law or procedure. The Supreme Court referred to the Court
63 Ibid., paras 6.3-6.4. 
64 Ibid., para. 6.5. 
65 Ibid., paras 6.6-6.10. 
66 Ibid., paras 6.13-6.14. 
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judgment in Pohotovost in which the Court had indicated that it was for a referring national court, 
when considering the judgment in an appeal against its decision to refer, to come to its own conclusion 
appropria 67  
Having concluded that it had the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of the High Court judgment 
containing the order for a preliminary reference, albeit limited to consideration of the lower instance 
national  
had erred, and dismissed the appeal.  
5. Eleven issues with Schrems II  
There are a number Schrems II judgment. The 
reasoning utilized by the Supreme Court to justify its conclusions is subtle, but constitutes a 
significant shift away from Campus Oil, which is problematic for a number of reasons. Despite being 
at pains to emphasize in its judgment that it was not doing so, the Supreme Court effectively, if not 
formally, overturned aspects of its earlier judgment in Campus Oil on its principle premise of it not 
being possible to appeal orders for a preliminary reference by lower instance national courts. Even if 
one were to categorise this foregoing observation as bombastic, the Supreme Court has at the very 
least seriously qualified the prohibition against appeals. It is thus contented that there are eleven 
identifiable issues with the judgment. It is suggested further below that these problems are a direct 
consequence of the permissive approach adopted by the Court in its case law on appeals against orders 
for preliminary references. 
Firstly, the use of Cartesio by the Supreme Court in Schrems II as permission for higher 
instance national courts to maintain or carve out de jure or de facto jurisdictions is concerning. In 
effect, Schrems II opens up the potential for appellate courts to pass judgment on matters related to 
. The Supreme Court in Schrems II 
over-relied on Cartesio, without looking at the entirety of the case law of the Court, and the spirit of 
why Article 267 TFEU is framed the way that it is. Article 267 TFEU requires faithful interpretation, 
and it is regretful the Supreme Court in Schrems II did follow such a reading. The judgment is 
incompatible with the true spirit and intent of the preliminary reference procedure, in that lower 
instance national courts are to be completely unfettered in their discretion to make an order for a 
preliminary reference, regardless of any findings of facts they may make.  
Secondly, much of the  on an artificial distinction: namely, 
between (1) the decision to refer and the wording of the order for a preliminary reference, which 
cannot be the subject of an appeal, and (2) any factual or relevant national law findings underpinning 
the decision to refer and the order for a preliminary reference itself. This distinction is artificial, 
because the exercise by a higher instance national court of a lower instance national 
findings or determinations of national law may involve passing judgment, albeit indirectly, on the 
necessity of a preliminary reference or on the wording of the questions referred. 
67 Ibid., paras. 6.16-6.18.  
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Therefore, while the lower instance national court may retain the discretion to maintain the 
preliminary reference and the wording of the questions, meanin
stricto sensu, consistent with the Cartesio judgment, it should be evident that the higher instance 
national order for a preliminary reference 
places a very significant de facto pressure on a lower instance national court to withdraw or amend 
the questions. Moreover, and this is effectively admitted by the Supreme Court itself, the distinction 
has no significance in Union law, since a preliminary reference remains pending in its entirety unless 
withdrawn or amended by the referring national court.  
Thirdly judgment relied on a misreading of its prior judgment in Campus 
Oil. Building on the foregoing distinction between the decision to refer, the order for a preliminary 
reference, and the factual findings underpinning the reference, the Supreme Court, without 
acknowledging that it is doing so, relied heavily on obiter dicta in Campus Oil to argue that factual 
findings underpinning a preliminary ref
of the Constitution. In doing so, however, the Supreme Court ignored the ratio of the Campus Oil 
judgment, which focused on the spirit and the letter of Article 267 TFEU as requiring lower instance 
national courts to have direct and unimpeded access to the Court. Moreover, the Supreme Court failed 
to note the further obiter comments of the Supreme Court in Campus Oil that even if an order for 
Constitution, the effective functioning of Article 
267 TFEU would have primacy over national constitutional provisions. As stated succinctly 
elsewhere, [] 68  
Fourthly newly found jurisdiction to review factual findings 
underpinning an order for a preliminary reference has the potential to undermine the direct and 
unimpeded access of lower instance national courts to the Court. The moral or political persuasiveness 
 instance national courts are unlikely to 
persist with their own version of the facts. Indeed, the Supreme Court made it clear that its judgments 
on the facts will be binding as a matter of national law.69 Moreover, in the event that lower instance 
national courts persists with their previously found version of the facts, the Court could be confronted 
with two alternative accounts of the facts, a problem, which though not beyond solution, is hardly 
ideal.70 Furthermore, the possibility of any appeals process, however narrowly defined, has the 
68 -Operation of National Authorities and Courts and the Community 
European Law 267. p. 284. Note: the former of the two authors 
was a sitting judge in the Supreme Court judgment in Schrems II, and the latter acted as one of the Senior Counsel for 
Facebook in Schrems II.  
69 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Schrems 
Dunne, Charleton, and Finlay Geoghegan JJ concurring), para. 6.17. 
70 As a general rule, resulting from the division of competences between the referring court and the Court of Justice, the 
latter has no role in fact finding and must accept the version of the facts provided in the order for reference: Case C-
140/09, Fallimento Traghetti del Mediterraneo,  ECLI:EU:C:2010:335 (see, Bertrand Wägenbaur, Court of Justice of the 
European Union: Commentary on Statute and Rules of Procedure (Nomos, 2012). p. 68); Case C-232/09 Danosa, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:674; Case C-310/09 Accor, ECLI:EU:C:2011:581 (see Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis and Kathleen 
Gutman, EU Procedural Law (Oxford University Press, 2014). p. 233, fn. 92). The Court of Justice has also acknowledged 
this limitation on its own jurisdiction in preliminary references at Point 7 of its Recommendations to national courts and 
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potential to be used by litigants, to slow litigation. The utility of the preliminary reference procedure 
depends in large part on timeliness, and any interruption to the line of communication between 
national courts of any instance and the Court may render the preliminary reference procedure less 
attractive to lower instance national courts.71  
Fifthly, unlike in the judgment in Campus Oil, the Supreme Court in Schrems II paid relatively 
little attention to the effective functioning of Article 267 TFEU. Rather, in determining whether the 
Supreme Court should exercise the jurisdiction to rule on underlying facts, the Supreme Court focused 
on factors that are related purely to the effective functioning of national the 
interests of justice and the p 72). In doing so, the Supreme Court, as 
stated above, ignored the ratio of the Campus Oil judgment, which related exclusively to the 
functioning of the preliminary reference procedure. When the Supreme Court did rely on Court 
jurisprudence (Cartesio and Prohotovost), it utilised them to support the general proposition that a 
higher instance national court 
questions in the order for a preliminary reference. That case law was thus used to permit the Supreme 
appellate jurisdiction over underlying factual determinations. There was, thus, 
inadequate consideration by the Supreme Court of the impact of disrupting the line of communication 
between lower instance national courts and the Court, which was the basis of the Campus Oil 
judgment. Moreover, it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not engage further with the case 
law of the Court, as no reference was made to historical jurisprudence in this area.  
Sixthly, given that  entail an interference with the direct 
and unimpeded access of a referring lower instance national court to the Court, the Supreme Court 
failed to make a compelling case as to why the Court needed to exercise this jurisdiction in any 
situation. It failed to make a clear case for why such an appeal was necessary, especially given their 
potential disruptive effect. This is a marked error on part of the Supreme Court. Although it 
emphasised the jurisdiction could only be exercised 73 if it is the 
situation that lower instance national courts, as a matter of Union law, may ignore the Supreme 
tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (2012/C 338/01). It is exceedingly rare for the 
Court of Justice to depart from the facts stated in the order for reference, though Broberg and Fenger have identified four 
categories of cases where this has occurred, none of which would appear to apply in a case where a national appellate 
Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (Oxford University Press, 2014). p. 365. Article 101 of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice also allows the Court to request clarification from the referring court.  
71 
Kokott and Cheryl Saunders (eds), The Future of the European Judicial System in a 
Comparative Perspective (Nomos 2006). p. 211. See, 
(2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 1071.  
72 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Schrems [
Dunne, Charleton, and Finlay Geoghegan JJ concurring), para. 6.10. 
73 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Schrems 
Dunne, Charleton, and Finlay Geoghegan JJ concurring), para. 6.13. 
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it has to be questioned whether the appeals procedure, however narrow, is worth the 
interference in the dialogue between lower instance national courts and the Court.  
The Supreme Court suggested that the benefit of being able to pass judgment on the findings 
of underlying fact by a lower instance national court, that it is less likely that the Court will be 
confronted with false information that may infect an eventual judgment. However, this ignores the 
fact that the questions in Schrems II relate to the validity of measures, rather than interpretation  an 
assessment that can more easily be carried out in a vacuum. It also ignored the fact that the parties 
can offer their own interpretation of the facts or national law in their pleadings before the Court in 
both written and oral form. Moreover, the Supreme Court neglected to fully consider the fact that the 
Court operates under the maxim curia novit iura (the court knows the law),74 and is not fully 
dependent on the interpretations of national law presented by the national court.  
Seventhly, it is perplexing why the Supreme Court actually chose to hear an appeal based 
upon the High Court judgment at all. The Supreme Court used the new leapfrog procedure to take the 
case for itself, rather than letting the Court of Appeal hear the case and thus apply the Campus Oil 
principle. The creation of the Court of Appeal in 2014, sitting between the High Court and the 
Supreme Court, allowed the Supreme Court to select which cases it decided to hear. This is turn, has 
allowed the Supreme Court to be extremely selective with its newfound docket control powers, 
allowing it to be more forceful in older lines of domestic jurisprudence that it wishes to amended, or 
overturn.75 With the Supreme Court now able to control which cases it hears, Campus Oil appears to 
be a victim in this quest. The Supreme Court did not provide an affirmative reason for the importance 
of interfering with Campus Oil.  
Eighthly, the Supreme Court also placed significant reliance on the sui generis nature of the 
proceedings in the case before it; specifically, the fact that the final determination would be taken by 
the Court, with the High Court having no further role in the proceedings. As such, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that there would, unlike in other cases where the referring court must apply the Court
judgment to determine the proceedings before it, be no opportunity for appeal to the Supreme Court.  
Ninthly, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court, in carving out the exception in the case 
before it, did not limit the scope of its appellate jurisdiction to just this situation. The judgment left 
open the possibility of  that might warrant 
. The Supreme Court did not satisfyingly 
close the issue, and thus left the issue open for it to revisit the issue again, should a given set of 
circumstances arise. For example, if the Supreme Court had upheld the appeal in relation to a finding 
of fact by the High Court, what obligation, if any, arises subsequently on the High Court judge who 
has made the order for reference? 
Tenthly, ional self-
interest perspective must be questioned. It can be argued that it served to heighten the risk of higher 
74  p. 545.  
75 Butler (n 46).  
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instance national courts authority being undermined by lower instance national courts ignoring it, as 
they are permitted to do as a matter of Union law. This dynamic was quite possibly at play in the 
United Kingdom (UK) in Wightman,76 where it may have been foolhardy for the UK Supreme Court 
to block the order for a preliminary reference made by the Scottish Court,77 lest its finding be ignored.  
Eleventh, and lastly, it was perfectly possible for other judges other than the one delivering 
the judgment to elaborate more on the Supreme 
 law and the applicable jurisdiction. Instead, there was one 
judgment from one member of the Supreme Court, with the four other sitting members of the Supreme 
Court concurring. None of them elaborated further in a concurrence (or dissent), and this is 
regrettable.  
Cumulatively therefore, what becomes apparent from the entire Schrems II case was an 
undoubtable judicial mishap, which the Supreme Court may have only realised after it granted the 
defendant leave to appeal before it. Only with the eventual judgment in which the Supreme Court 
delivered, did it then begin to see the limitations imposed upon it.  
6. Extending Cartesio to protect lower instance national courts 
Whilst Cartesio is the lead case from the point of view of Union law regarding appeals of 
orders for reference, it is not a definitive framework. As the Supreme Court in Schrems II noted, 
78 of the Cartesio judgment. This point has also 
been made elsewhere.79 There are undoubtedly blind spots in the preliminary reference procedure,80 
including hasty referrals and non-referrals, but these can in many cases be beyond what the Court 
itself can do much about within its remit. By contrast, the Court has much power to rectify issues 
regarding appeals of orders for a preliminary reference  by prohibiting such higher instance national 
court behaviour.  
Article 267 TFEU is expressed as conferring discretion on lower instance national courts as 
to whether to refer or not (subject to some minimal controls by the Court), and national procedural 
rules or practices cannot stand in the way of this discretion. The Court, if presented with an 
opportunity, should make this abundantly clear to all national courts, to tame any potential mischief. 
A consequentialist reading of how Union law will end up, if this matter is not dealt with, has already 
been pondering in judicial proceedings. As put by Advocate General Maduro regarding orders for 
76 Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant) v Wightman and others (Respondents), UKSC 2018/2109 
(Lady Hale, Lord Reed, and Lord Hodge), 20 November 2018.  
77 That lead to, Case C-621/18, Andy Wightman and Others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:999.  
78 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Schrems 
Dunne, Charleton, and Finlay Geoghegan JJ concurring). 
79 Preliminary References as a Right  but for Whom? The Extent to Which 
Preliminary Reference Decisions Can Be Subject to Appeal  
80 See,  
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national rule or practice, orders for reference by power courts would systematically become subject 
to appeal, giving rise to a situation in which  at least de facto  national law allowed only courts of 
81 More forcefully, he stated
tantamount to allowing national procedural law to alter the conditions set out in Article [267 
82  
This is exactly why national practices, such as those in Schrems II ought not to be tolerated. 
Whilst national courts act as the indirect means of seeking access to the Court to determine the validity 
of Union law, this door must be kept open, for otherwise, the Court, which has limited means for 
applicants to seek access to it is already rather narrow, would be curtailing this access even further. 
As the Supreme Court admitted in Schrems II, it i
83 The statement is an 
admission that higher instance national courts have next-to-no wriggle room. Union law leans heavily 
in favour of not allowing appeals of orders for a preliminary reference, and it is a practice in which 
higher instance national courts should not be engaging.  
6.1. The essential work of lower instance national courts 
The EU judicial architecture, encompassing national courts as one of the elementary 
interlocutors, affords a separation between the role of the Court, and that of national courts within 
national legal orders of EU Member States. All national courts, whatever their instance, have an 
unfettered and unfiltered possibility to interact with the Court through the preliminary reference 
procedure.84 Ensuring that lower instance national courts can make a preliminary reference is crucial 
to ensuring that Union law is interpreted uniformly, and applied consistency across all Member States. 
This is hampered if higher instance national courts can filter preliminary references by means of their 
own doing. Thus, it is contented that the Court needs to revisit Cartesio, building upon its prior 
jurisprudence by more affirmatively prohibiting higher instance national courts from entertaining 
appeals of orders for preliminary references from lower instance national courts.  
There is no room for the policing of references by higher instance national courts. Many of 
the most important contributions to Union law and the judgments of the Court have been cases that 
have been referred to it by lower instance national courts. Despite the Court having previously stated 
udicial authorities of the Member States[] which are responsible for ensuring that 
81 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, ECLI:EU:C:2008:294, 
paragraph 20.  
82 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, ECLI:EU:C:2008:294, 
paragraph 20. This point of view is implicitly disagreed with in the Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, Case C-
173/09, Georgi Ivanov Elchinov v Natsionalna zdravnoosiguritelna kasa, ECLI:EU:C:2010:336, paragraphs 34-39. 
83 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Schrems II  
84 This said, the possibility does not mean it is guaranteed interaction with the Court. For the Court has criteria that must 
-judicial bodies and orders 
n Law Review.  
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85 this cannot be left unsupervised. 
The Court also has a protective role.  
It has been noted that the use by the Court of the preliminary reference procedure as a means 
effectiveness and esteem of Union law, and thereby its own power, by empowering lower national 
courts and litigants at the expense of higher instance national courts and governments.86 Even if this 
theory is not accepted, which pits lower instance national courts against their more senior brethren; it 
is almost undeniable that the effectiveness of the preliminary reference procedure will depend on the 
freedom of lower instance national courts to refer.   
6.2. The value of lower instance national courts 
In Schrems II, the Supreme Court attempting, in effect, to filter cases referred by lower 
instance national courts to the Court of Justice is puzzling, for national courts of all instances in the 
Member State have normally been prudent with their competence to refer. There has been no overload 
from national courts seeking interpretation of Union law from the Court. In fact, for many years, the 
opposite was quite the problem  the lack of references coming from Member State  courts.87 They 
had tended not to make orders for preliminary references to the Court lightly, for it temporarily 
resulted in the staying of a case, in a Member State not exactly known for swift judicial processes.88  
The High Court values highly its right to make orders for preliminary references. It has 
acknowledged - as to whether to make a preliminary reference 
or not.89 That said, it has long been practice, in accordance with the judgment of Pigs and Bacon 
Commission v McCarren,90 that a preliminary reference must be made where it is necessary to do so. 
In  People Over Wind and Peter Sweetman v Coillte Teoranta case,91 on an order to make a 
preliminary reference, it was said that t would damage the uniform interpretation and application 
Union law, diminish the preliminary ruling procedure, and be a disservice to persons coming 
before the courts with arguments arising out of or pursuant to Union law if the High Court were to 
seek single-handedly to resolve disputes, in instances where the need for a preliminary reference is 
necessary, in the hope that such a reference might in the future be made by an appellate court 
to sustain the brin 92 At an even higher instance, the then President of the 
85 Case C-2/88 IMM, J. J. Zwartveld and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1990:440, paragraph 10.  
86 Anne-
International Organization 41. p. 64.  
87 For detailed analysis of this problem, see, Elaine Fahey, Practice and Procedure in Preliminary References to Europe: 
30 Years of Article 234 EC Case Law from the Irish Courts (First Law 2007).  
88 See, for example, Keaney v Ireland, Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 30 April 2020, Application 
 
89 Friends of the Irish Environment Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála & anor, [2019] IEHC 80, Simons J, paragraph 11. 
90 Pigs and Bacon Commission v. McCarren [1978] JISEL 87, Costello J. 
91 Case C-323/17, People Over Wind and Peter Sweetman v. Coillte Teoranta, ECLI:EU:C:2018:244. 
92 People over Winds and Peter Sweetman v. Coillte Teoranta [2017] IEHC 171, Barrett J, paragraph 21.  
Just Say No! Appeals against Orders for a Preliminary Reference 
 
 
Court of Appeal of Union law 
to make an Article 267 [TFEU] reference, irrespective of any views which the Supreme Court may 
93  
The Supreme Court cannot and should not exercise censorship of lower instance national 
courts. Lower ] 267 TFEU; 
[and] there is no practice whereby [their] competence in this regard has been yielded by [them] to the 
 them.94 This could not be more correct. The judges of the Supreme Court of 
today were trained, and are knowledgeable in Union law. They should know better than to facilitate 
pleas of counsel before them who know, just like they do, that higher instance national courts, directly 
or in a circumventive fashion, are trying to restrict lower instance national courts, which is contrary 
to Union law. Lower instance national courts deserve the trust of higher instance national courts, and 
it is this trust that the Court, in Union law, must defend.  
6.3. The rule of law and judicial independence 
Schrems II occurred in a Member State that is not seeing elements of democratic backsliding.95 
In recent times, however, the Court has taken a particular strong line of jurisprudence regarding the 
independence of judges in national courts in other Member States.96 It is conceivable that higher 
instance national courts could abuse powers at their disposal under national procedural laws and 
practices to police reference from lower courts. This is no longer a trite observation in circumstances 
where judicial independence and the rule of law are not to be assumed as guaranteed in practice in 
and by 
extension the rule of law principle 97  
It should not escape notice that the proceedings that gave rise to the judgment in Cartesio 
originated in Hungary not long after the accession of the Central and Eastern European states. Whilst 
just over ten years old, it can be argued that Cartesio is a judgment of its time. Elsewhere, Cartesio 
appeal in Schrems II, pointing to the fact that Cartesio 
93  [2015] IECA 227. Ryan P, paragraph 34.  
94 People over Winds and Peter Sweetman v. Coillte Teoranta [2017] IEHC 171, Barrett J, paragraph 19.  
95 On the rule of law in the Member State concerned, see, Pa
Judicial Power in Ireland (Institute of Public Administration 2018). Note: the author acted 
as one of the Senior Counsel for Facebook in Schrems II.  
96 Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117 Association 
of Portuguese Judges ; and, Case C-619/18, European Commission v. Republic of Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 
Independence of the Supreme Court ), amongst others. See, Butler (n 84).  
97   p. 3.  
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complexity of its facts,98 
from the then recently acceded Member States.99  
Cartesio also, crucially, pre-dates the emergence of subsequent rule of law and judicial 
independence issues in some of these Member States. The Court in Association of Portuguese Judges, 
a seminal case of judicial independence, pointed to the long-settled requirement that referring national 
courts be independent.100 In recent years, questions have arisen as to the state of the rule of law in 
some Member States, with governmental interference with the independence of national courts being 
the subject of specific focus. While Article 258 TFEU proceedings maybe an effective tool to address 
infringements of the rule of law and the requirement of judicial independence, as demonstrated in 
Commission v Poland,101 the preliminary reference procedure allows lower instance national courts, 
whose independence may not be compromised in the same manner as higher instance national courts, 
to make orders for preliminary references on issues pertaining to the rule of law, is also a mechanism 
of significant potential.102  
There is a pending preliminary reference before the Court from a Hungarian court where, it is 
assumed, the issue of Cartesio will arise once more.103 The Hungarian Supreme Court (Kúria) in 
relating to judicial independence in Hungary was unlawful. While Cartesio does not preclude a lower 
instance national court from persisting with the preliminary reference, pressure is brought to bear by 
the Kúria  
willingness to refer in the future. It is doubtful that the Court in Cartesio foresaw such developments. 
The permissive approach taken by the Court heretofore, which has emphasised national procedural 
autonomy, must, it is respectfully submitted, be revisited in order to safeguard the functioning of the 
EU legal order.  
7. Conclusion 
There is no reason for the Court to be shy in extending its Cartesio judgment to prohibiting 
appeals of orders for preliminary references, for it has doled out sharp rebukes and limitations on 
98 
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national courts abilities before.104 The time has come for the Court to take a more assertive approach 
than it did in Cartesio. The Court, elsewhere, has strongly defended the right of lower instance 
national courts to engage in judicial dialogue with the Court. It now needs to take its level of 
protection of lower instance national courts to another level.  
As President Lenaerts has stated, 
[Article 267 TFEU] would be contrary to the reallocation of powers sought by the founding Treaties 
and the EU acquis 105 Therefore, the Supreme Court judgment in Schrems II serves as a timely 
reminder of the latitude afforded by the Court in its case law to higher instance national courts to 
references. While Schrems II has, as argued above, the potential to interfere with the functioning of 
the preliminary reference procedure, a procedure of fundamental importance to the effectiveness and 
uniformity of Union law, it is undeniable that it is, stricto sensu, for now, consistent with the 
jurisprudence of the Court. Arguably, the Supreme Court in Schrems II should have made an order 
for a preliminary reference to the Court on this point itself to determine its actual reviewing power, 
and how its proposed answer to the questions put to it on appeal were in compliance with Cartesio 
and Article 267 TFEU more generally. Regrettably, the Supreme Court did not do so.  
The Supreme Court in Campus Oil ruled that appeals of orders to make a preliminary 
106 The Court is now invited 
to follow this, and to fine-tune its doctrine on this matter, before questionable practices at national 
courts become more widespread. Advocate General Warner in Rheinmühlen Düsseldorf I back in 
1973 got it most correct,107 in that failing to prohibit higher instance national courts from interfering 
in dialogue between the Court and lower instance national courts is tantamount to enabling and seeing 
t it considers reasonable 
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